The Mechanism of Accountability: Understanding Impeachment under Nepal’s Legal Framework
Every functioning democracy rests on the simple idea that no person, however senior or powerful, sits above the law. In Nepal, the working of the state is divided between three institutions, namely the Legislature that frames the law, the Executive that gives effect to it, and the Judiciary that interprets it. Each is given a defined sphere of authority, and each is expected to remain within it. When the holder of a high office begins to test the outer edges of that authority, or worse, abandons the duties owed to it, the Constitution provides a remedy. That remedy is impeachment.
Impeachment is not a criminal trial, and it is not a vote of no confidence. It is a constitutional process by which Parliament examines the conduct of certain senior office holders and, where the case is made out, removes them from office. The purpose is corrective rather than punitive. It exists to protect the institutions of the state from individuals whose continued presence would undermine public trust, and to remind those who hold high office that authority is borrowed from the people and may be withdrawn.
This article sets out the legal framework governing impeachment in Nepal, examines the principal cases in which the process has been invoked or threatened, and considers the wider constitutional significance of the device. The discussion is grounded in the Constitution of Nepal 2072 and the House of Representatives Regulations 2079, together with the leading instances in which Parliament and parallel constitutional mechanisms have tested these provisions in practice.
Who Can Be Impeached and on What Grounds
Impeachment in Nepal is reserved for a narrow group of constitutional office holders. Ordinary civil servants and political appointees do not fall within its scope. The intention behind this restriction is straightforward. Impeachment is a heavy weapon, and the Constitution confines its use to those officials whose independence and tenure are protected precisely because their work requires insulation from the ordinary pressures of politics.
Article 101(1) of the Constitution of Nepal 2072, read together with Rule 157(1) of the House of Representatives Regulations 2079, governs the impeachment of the President and the Vice President. Article 101(2) extends the same machinery to the Chief Justice and Judges of the Supreme Court, members of the Judicial Council, and the chiefs and officials of the Constitutional Bodies. These bodies include the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority, the Election Commission, the Public Service Commission, the Auditor General, the National Human Rights Commission and others created under Part 21 of the Constitution.
The grounds on which impeachment may be brought are set out in Article 101(2) and (5). They are framed in deliberately broad terms, on the understanding that wrongdoing at the highest level rarely fits a tidy statutory definition. The recognised grounds are a serious violation of the Constitution, incompetence or clear lack of ability, bad conduct, failure to discharge official duties honestly, and a serious breach of the code of conduct. Each of these heads carries weight on its own, and a single motion may rely on more than one.
The breadth of language is intentional. Constitutional drafting cannot anticipate every form of misconduct that an office holder might fall into. By using terms such as bad conduct and failure to discharge duties honestly, the framers left room for Parliament to apply judgement on the facts before it. The trade-off is that broad language can also be misused, which is why the procedural safeguards discussed later in this article matter as much as the grounds themselves.
Putting Flesh on the Bones: Lessons from Practice
The language of the Constitution becomes meaningful only when it is tested against real conduct. Nepal has now seen several high-profile cases in which impeachment has been invoked, threatened or pre-empted by parallel constitutional processes. Taken together, the cases below show how the abstract grounds in Article 101 have been read in practice and where the limits of the machinery lie.
Rana Bahadur Bam
Supreme Court Justice, 2012
Justice Rana Bahadur Bam faced an impeachment process founded on allegations of gross misconduct and financial corruption. He was said to have accepted substantial bribes in exchange for granting bail or reducing sentences in serious cases, including matters involving organised crime and financial fraud. An independent judicial inquiry, led by a sitting Supreme Court justice, concluded that there was a prima facie case of misconduct and that his rulings showed a consistent pattern of favouring accused persons of a particular description. On the strength of those findings, the Judicial Council formally requested Parliament to initiate impeachment. The process was brought to an abrupt end when Bam was assassinated in Kathmandu in May 2012. The case is instructive because it shows how the Judicial Council can act as a feeder mechanism to Parliament, presenting impeachment with an evidentiary base before any political debate begins.
Lokman Singh Karki
Chief Commissioner of the CIAA, 2016
Lokman Singh Karki was the first major test of the impeachment machinery in the post 2015 constitutional order. As head of the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority, he wielded considerable power over corruption investigations. Lawmakers alleged that he had turned the Commission into an instrument of political pressure, targeting opponents, interfering in administrative matters outside the Commission’s remit, and intimidating officials who refused to cooperate. The motion stalled in Parliament. However, in a separate proceeding the Supreme Court considered whether he met the constitutional requirement of high moral character and ruled that he did not, disqualifying him from office on that ground. The episode demonstrates that the failure of an impeachment motion does not necessarily leave an unfit official in place, since the judiciary can still intervene where the constitutional preconditions for the office are missing.
Sushila Karki
Chief Justice, 2017
A year later, Parliament turned its attention to the head of the judiciary. Chief Justice Sushila Karki, the first woman to hold the office, faced an impeachment motion centred on incompetence and bad conduct. The substance of the complaint was that she had encroached on executive authority by intervening in the appointment of the Inspector General of Police, and that she had failed to assign cases to judges impartially. The motion was widely seen as a reaction to recent judicial decisions rather than a genuine response to misconduct. Its mere registration automatically suspended the Chief Justice, which itself attracted constitutional challenge, and the Supreme Court issued an interim order against the suspension. The motion was eventually withdrawn. The case illustrates two important points, that incompetence and bad conduct, in the impeachment context, will typically attach to allegations of jurisdictional overreach and partiality, and that the suspension provision itself can become a flashpoint for constitutional litigation.
Gopal Prasad Parajuli
Chief Justice, 2018
The case of Gopal Prasad Parajuli illustrates how impeachment can be overtaken by parallel constitutional machinery. While Parliament was preparing a motion against him, the Judicial Council acted first, removing him from office after it emerged that he had falsified personal records to lower his official age and extend his tenure on the bench. Alongside the documentary irregularities, lawmakers had been gathering material on allegations of judicial bias, the strategic use of contempt proceedings to silence critics, and the manipulation of bench assignments in cases of political and commercial significance. The episode shows that the grounds set out in Article 101(2), particularly bad conduct and failure to discharge duties honestly, may also be enforced indirectly through the Judicial Council where impeachment would be slower or more uncertain.
Deepak Raj Joshee
Acting Chief Justice, 2018
Following Parajuli’s exit, Deepak Raj Joshee was nominated to the office of Chief Justice as the senior most sitting justice. His parliamentary hearing raised serious concerns about judicial competence and integrity. Lawmakers questioned his vision for reform, scrutinised the authenticity of his academic credentials including his SLC certificates and roll numbers, and examined controversial decisions such as a stay order in a major land tax dispute. The Parliamentary Hearing Committee ultimately rejected his nomination by a two thirds majority, the first such rejection in Nepal’s history. Faced with the prospect of a formal impeachment motion if he sought to remain on the bench, Joshee resigned early in order to preserve his retirement benefits. The case is notable for showing that the impeachment threshold of two thirds can also operate at the appointment stage through the hearing process, providing an upstream filter against unsuitable candidates.
Cholendra Shumsher JB Rana
Chief Justice, 2022
The most serious test of the modern impeachment framework came with the motion against Chief Justice Cholendra Shumsher JB Rana. The allegations were unusually wide ranging. He was said to have demanded a share of cabinet positions in exchange for cooperation with the executive, to have permitted the influence of middlemen in the assignment of cases, to have tolerated corruption within the court system, and to have brought the work of the Supreme Court to a near standstill. The other justices of the court refused to sit on benches with him, and the Nepal Bar Association joined the boycott. The motion drew principally on failure to discharge official duties honestly and a serious breach of the code of conduct. It showed that honesty in the constitutional sense is not confined to financial probity but extends to the duty to preserve the independence and integrity of the institution led by the office holder. The proceedings lapsed when the term of the House ended, leaving the substantive questions unresolved by Parliament, but the record of the motion remains a reference point for the kinds of conduct that fall within Article 101(2).
Procedure and Investigation
The procedural rules are designed to balance two competing concerns. On one side, the process must be capable of moving with reasonable speed, since the suspension of a sitting Chief Justice or a constitutional commissioner cannot be allowed to drift indefinitely. On the other, the gravity of removing a person from a constitutional office demands careful investigation and a fair hearing.
Article 101(5) requires at least three members of the House to sign a complaint, setting out enough detail about the alleged offences to allow a proper response. Beyond this initial trigger, Article 101(2) and Rule 157(1) require the support of at least one fourth of the sitting members of the House before a motion can be formally registered. The combined effect is that an impeachment cannot be launched by a single disaffected member, but it also does not need majority support to begin.
Once a motion is registered, the official concerned is suspended from the exercise of office and loses the authority associated with it until the House reaches a final decision. This is one of the most controversial features of the regime, since suspension takes effect before any finding of wrongdoing. The justification offered is that an official accused of serious constitutional violations cannot be allowed to continue exercising the very powers that are said to have been abused. The Supreme Court has, on occasion, been willing to examine whether the suspension itself is being used in a manner inconsistent with the Constitution, as the Sushila Karki episode showed.
If the House is in session, the Speaker is required to schedule the first discussion within fifteen days of registration. The matter is then referred to an Impeachment Recommendation Committee of eleven members, constituted under Article 101(3) and (4). The Committee is tasked with investigating the allegations, examining witnesses and documents, giving the accused official an opportunity to respond, and preparing a report for the House. The Committee’s recommendation does not bind the House, but it shapes the debate that follows.
The Vote and What Follows
The threshold for a successful impeachment is deliberately high. Article 101(2) requires a two thirds majority of the sitting members of the House of Representatives. This is more than a simple majority and is intended to ensure that an official is removed only where the case attracts support that crosses party lines. A government with a bare majority cannot, on its own, remove a Chief Justice or a constitutional commissioner without persuading members beyond its own ranks.
If the motion is carried, removal takes effect immediately. The Secretary General of the Parliament is required to notify the President, the Council of Ministers and the removed official. The constitutional consequences are significant. The official loses the office, the privileges that attach to it and the protection that the office had previously conferred against ordinary process.
Crucially, removal does not amount to an acquittal of any underlying criminal conduct, nor does it provide immunity from later prosecution. If the acts that gave rise to the impeachment also amount to offences under the general criminal law, the removed official may be prosecuted in the ordinary courts in the usual way. Impeachment, in this sense, is the gateway rather than the final destination. It strips away the office, and with it the practical and legal shields that the office provided, leaving the individual to be treated like any other citizen.
The Wider Constitutional Significance
Impeachment occupies an unusual place in the architecture of the Constitution. It is a political process in the sense that it takes place in Parliament and is decided by elected members. At the same time, it is a legal process in the sense that it is governed by constitutional provisions, applies defined grounds and requires a structured investigation. The interplay between these two characters is what makes impeachment both powerful and contentious.
The cases discussed above show that impeachment rarely operates in isolation. The Judicial Council, the Parliamentary Hearing Committee and the Supreme Court each play a part in policing the conduct and qualifications of senior office holders. Where impeachment stalls, as in Lokman Singh Karki’s case, the courts may step in on questions of basic eligibility. Where impeachment would be slow, as in Parajuli’s case, the Judicial Council can act first on documentary or conduct grounds. Where appointment itself is in issue, as in Joshee’s case, the hearing process can apply a similar two thirds standard at the entry point. Impeachment, in other words, is one part of a wider accountability system rather than a standalone remedy.
Looked at from one angle, impeachment is the ultimate expression of the principle that public office is a trust. Those who exercise the powers of the state on behalf of the people may be called back when that trust has been broken. Looked at from another angle, it is a process that risks being shaped by the political weather of the day. The Sushila Karki case drew sharp criticism on the ground that the motion was deployed as a means of pressuring the judiciary rather than as a genuine response to misconduct. The cases of Cholendra Shumsher JB Rana and Lokman Singh Karki, by contrast, show how the process can also stall when the political will to complete it falls away.
Conclusion
The framework for impeachment in Nepal does more than provide a route for the removal of an unfit official. It expresses a constitutional commitment to the idea that authority is conditional. The Constitution of Nepal 2072 and the House of Representatives Regulations 2079 set out who can be removed, on what grounds, by what procedure and on what threshold of support. The cases of Rana Bahadur Bam, Lokman Singh Karki, Sushila Karki, Gopal Prasad Parajuli, Deepak Raj Joshee and Cholendra Shumsher JB Rana, although each ended in a different way, together demonstrate how those provisions operate in practice and where their limits lie.
The strength of the impeachment mechanism does not lie in how often it succeeds. It lies in the fact that it exists, that its grounds are defined, and that no holder of the highest constitutional offices can act in the knowledge that they are beyond reach. In this way, impeachment serves not only as a remedy when things have gone wrong, but as a quiet constraint on those who hold high office every day they are in it.
