One year has passed since the violence of 8 and 9 September 2025 (23 and 24 Bhadra 2082). Government figures place the death toll at 76 and the number of injured at 2,638, with 39 demonstrators reported to have died of gunshot injuries. The commission of inquiry chaired by former Special Court chairman (Judge) Gauri Bahadur Karki reported in March 2026, and the National Human Rights Commission issued recommendations to the Government on 27 May 2026. Arrests were made and statements taken, but implementation of the recommendations is still described as incomplete.
A single question now dominates public discussion: has the passage of one year made prosecution impossible? The answer is neither a simple yes nor a simple no. Nepali law fixes limitation offence by offence, and the position of a bereaved family, an injured survivor and a former detainee differ materially from one another.
Limitation Under Nepali Criminal Law
A statute of limitation, or hadmyad, is the period within which a criminal complaint must be initiated. The National Penal Code, 2074 does not impose a single period for all offences; each chapter carries its own rule, ranging from three months to years. The consequence is that one incident may generate several categories of offence, each governed by a different deadline. The limitation question must therefore be answered offence by offence, not incident by incident.
The Deaths: Section 187 is More Nuanced Than Simply "No Limitation"
Unlawful killing is addressed in Chapter 12 of the Penal Code, principally Sections 177 to 182 of the Penal Code, covering intentional killing, killing with knowledge that death was likely, certain forms of culpable killing, and death caused by recklessness or negligence. The limitation provision is Section 187.
Homicide in Nepal has no limitation period. The authenticated text is more particular. Section 187(1) permits a complaint at any time in the circumstances described in the opening part of the provision; it further provides that where a homicide complaint has been made but the offender has not been identified, no complaint will lie after 20 years, and it refers to two years from the incident where no homicide complaint has been made.
It follows that the first anniversary does not, by itself, extinguish liability for the September 2025 deaths. Equally, families should not assume an unlimited period in which to act. Where no qualifying complaint has been registered, the two-year language becomes potentially decisive, which makes the position before the second anniversary a matter of some urgency.
The threshold question for any bereaved family is therefore whether a complaint or police report concerning that particular death has already been registered, and under which offence. That must be established from the official investigation record rather than inferred from press reporting. Under Section 4 of the National Criminal Procedure (Code) Act, 2074, police may receive information concerning a Schedule 1 offence and are also required to record information obtained from other sources, so a family member need not have lodged it personally.
The injured: Section 199 imposes a shorter timetable
Offences of hurt and grievous hurt are governed separately, and Section 199 sets out their limitation period. It prescribes three months for an offence under Section 196, six months calculated from the regaining of consciousness for an offence under Section 197, and one year from the date of the offence for the remaining offences in that chapter.
For many hurt and grievous-hurt allegations arising from 8 and 9 September 2025, the applicable period is one year, placing those complaints at or very near the statutory deadline as at the date of this note. The calculation should be based on the provision and the procedural history, not the anniversary alone. The Supreme Court issued general orders on procedural deadlines following the disruption to the courts in 2025; whether those orders extend the period in a given case requires examination of the order and the facts, and should be neither assumed nor discounted.
Torture and Ill-Treatment: Six Months, with a Variable Starting Point
Section 167 of the Penal Code prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment by authorities empowered to investigate offences, prosecute, enforce the law or hold persons in custody, and provides that a superior’s order affords no defence. The limitation period is fixed by Section 170(2), which generally bars a complaint after six months, calculated from the commission of the offence or, where applicable, from release from arrest, control, custody, detention, or imprisonment.
That qualification is significant: a former detainee cannot necessarily calculate the deadline by counting six months from September 2025, because the release date may govern. Article 22 of the Constitution separately protects against torture, and Article 21 guarantees the rights of victims of crime. The six-month period has attracted sustained international criticism, but until it is amended or held inapplicable by a competent court, Section 170 remains the domestic starting point.
The Legal Impact of the Commission Reports and the Arrests
The Karki Commission and the National Human Rights Commission may identify potential violations, recommend investigations, compensation, or institutional reforms, and generate material relevant to later proceedings. Neither is a criminal court. A recommendation is not a charge sheet and does not establish guilt.
Former Prime Minister K P Sharma Oli and former Home Minister Ramesh Lekhak were arrested during the investigation and subsequently released following proceedings before the Supreme Court, subject to continued cooperation. Those proceedings neither established their guilt nor conclusively cleared them; the Court addressed the legality and duration of detention while permitting the investigation to continue. The allegations remain matters for investigation and, if charges are filed, for adjudication by the competent court. Political office, commission criticism, arrest and media coverage are not substitutes for proof of the elements of an offence.
The Practical Reality After One Year
Limitation is only part of the accountability question. Even where a complaint remains available, delay materially impairs an investigation. Ballistic material, firearms registers, deployment records, command and communication logs, CCTV and mobile footage, medical and forensic evidence and witness recollection all deteriorate with time. That is an evidential problem rather than a limitation problem, and the absence does not cure it of a statutory deadline.
Expedition cannot, however, displace due process. Individual responsibility must be established on admissible evidence rather than inferred from a person’s position in the chain of command. A prompt investigation and a fair one are complementary requirements.
Allegations arising from arson or property damage by protest participants are to be assessed separately. Evidence that a participant committed an offence does not determine whether a particular use of force by a security officer was lawful, and vice versa. Each allegation requires its own evidence, classification and procedural protections.
What Should Now be established?
- For a death: whether a homicide complaint or police report has been formally registered, under which offence, and on what date.
- For an injured survivor: the offence potentially applicable, the resulting Section 199 period, and whether any court-ordered extension bears on the calculation. This should be checked immediately.
- For a former detainee: the date of the alleged conduct, the period of detention and the date of release, each of which may affect the Section 170 calculation.
- Where registration is refused: Section 5 of the Criminal Procedure Code permits the complainant to approach the District Government Attorney Office or a higher police office with the information refused under Section 4. Where a deadline is close, reliance on informal correspondence or verbal requests is inadvisable, as the date, form and legal status of the complaint may prove decisive.
Conclusion
One year on, Nepali law supports neither of the two simplest narratives. Criminal liability has not uniformly expired, nor may every death be prosecuted indefinitely. For deaths, Section 187 makes the existence and status of a homicide complaint critical. For most hurt-related offences, Section 199 may impose a one-year deadline. For torture, Section 170 fixes six months, subject to its own rules on commencement. The practical lesson for victims is not that time has run out, but that the status of each complaint should be established without delay. For the State, the anniversary raises a distinct question: whether Nepal’s procedural law affords victims of serious State-related violence sufficient time to seek justice while preserving the due process rights of the accused.
Frequently asked questions
Is it too late to prosecute the September 2025 deaths?
Not merely because one year has passed. Section 187 should not, however, be described as conferring an unlimited period in every case.
Are injured protesters subject to the same rules as the deceased?
No. Section 199 imposes shorter periods, commonly one year from the date of the offence, for hurt-related offences, with shorter periods for specified provisions.
What is the limitation period for torture?
Section 170(2) generally provides six months for an offence under Section 167, with the starting point determined by the statutory circumstances, including release from custody where applicable.
Does a commission recommendation or an arrest establish liability?
No. Criminal liability must be determined through investigation, prosecution and trial, and the presumption of innocence continues to apply.
